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Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott have been awarded the 2004 Bank of Sweden Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to
two closely related areas of macroeconomic research. The ﬁrst concerns the design of
macroeconomic policy. Kydland and Prescott uncovered inherent imperfections–credibility
problems–in the ability of governments to implement desirable economic policies. The sec-
ond area concerns business cycle ﬂuctuations. Kydland and Prescott demonstrated how
variations in technological development–the main source of long-run economic growth–can
lead to short-run ﬂuctuations. In so doing, they oﬀered a new and operational paradigm for
macroeconomic analysis based on microeconomic foundations. Kydland and Precsott’s work
has transformed academic research in economics, as well as the practice of macroeconomic
analysis and policymaking.
1.1 General background
During the early postwar period, macroeconomic analysis was dominated by the view mar-
shalled by Keynes (1936). In this view, short-run ﬂuctuations in output and employment
are mainly due to variations in aggregate demand, i.e., in investors’ willingness to invest
and consumers’ willingness to consume. Moreover, macroeconomic stabilization policy can,
and should, systematically control aggregate demand so as to avoid recurring ﬂuctuations
in output. These ideas largely reﬂected the experience from the Great Depression, when
a deep protracted trough in aggregate output, along with falling employment and capital
utilization, were observed throughout the western world. Keynesian macroeconomic analy-
sis interpreted these phenomena as failures of the market system to coordinate demand and
supply, which provided an obvious motive for government intervention.
Until the mid-1970s, the dominating Keynesian paradigm seemed quite successful in ex-
plaining macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. But real-world developments in the late 1970s revealed
serious shortcomings of the earlier analysis. It could not explain the new phenomenon of
simultaneous inﬂation and unemployment. This so-called stagﬂation seemed closely related
to shocks on the supply side of the economy: oil price hikes and the worldwide slowdown
of productivity growth. Such supply shocks had played only a subordinate role in the Key-
nesian framework. Moreover, conventional macroeconomic policy, based on existing theory,
was unable to cope with the new problems. Rather, monetary and ﬁscal policy appeared
to make matters worse in many countries by accommodating private-sector expectations of
high price and wage increases. This occurred despite the stated objective of governments
and central banks to maintain low and stable inﬂation.
Keynesian models were also criticized on methodological grounds. Models used in applied
work built on broad theoretical and empirical generalizations (“reduced forms”) summariz-
ing the relationships governing the main macroeconomic variables, such as output, inﬂation,
unemployment, and consumption. Robert Lucas’s research in the early and mid-1970s (Lu-
cas 1972, 1973, 1976) pointed to the drawbacks of this approach, in particular that the
relationships between macroeconomic variables are likely to be inﬂuenced by economic pol-
icy itself. As a result, policy analysis based on these relationships might turn out to be
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analyzed without explicit microeconomic foundations. Only by carefully modeling the be-
havior of individual economic agents, such as consumers and ﬁrms, would it be possible to
derive robust conclusions regarding private-sector responses to economic policy. The build-
ing blocks of such an analysis–e.g., consumers’ preferences, ﬁrms’ technologies, and market
structures–are likely to be robust to changes in economic policy.
As the Lucas critique rapidly gained wide acceptance, development of an alternative and
operational macroeconomic framework was called for. This was a daunting task, however.
Such a new framework had to be based on solid microeconomic foundations. It also had
to give an integral role to economic policy and economic agents’ perceptions of how policy
is determined. The award-winning contributions by Kydland and Prescott appeared in two
joint articles, which took decisive steps forward in these respects.
1.2 The contributions in brief
“Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, from 1977, studies
the sequential choice of policies, such as tax rates or monetary policy instruments. The
key insight is that many policy decisions are subject to a fundamental time consistency
problem. Consider a rational and forward-looking government that chooses a time plan for
policy in order to maximize the well-being of its citizens. Kydland and Prescott show that
if given an opportunity to re-optimize and change its plan at a later date, the government
will generally do so. What is striking about this result is that it is not rooted in conﬂicting
objectives between the government and its citizens, nor is it due to the ability of unrestricted
policymakers to react to unforeseen shocks. The result, instead, is simply a problematic
logical implication of rational dynamic policymaking when private-sector expectations place
restrictions on the policy decisions.
As i g n i ﬁcant upshot is that governments unable to make binding commitments regarding
future policies will encounter a credibility problem. Speciﬁcally, the public will realize that
future government policy will not necessarily coincide with the announced policy, unless
the plan already encompasses the incentives for future policy change. In other words, se-
quential policymaking faces a credibility constraint. In mathematical terms, optimal policy
decisions cannot be analyzed solely by means of control theory (i.e., dynamic optimization
theory). Instead they should be studied as the outcome of a game, where current and future
policymakers are modeled as distinct players. In this game, each player has to anticipate
the reaction of future players to current play: rational expectations are required. Kydland
and Prescott analyzed general policy games as well as speciﬁc games of monetary and ﬁscal
policymaking. They showed that the outcome in a rational-expectations equilibrium where
the government cannot commit to policy in advance–discretionary policymaking–results
in lower welfare than the outcome in an equilibrium where the government can commit.
Kydland and Prescott’s 1977 article had a far-reaching impact not only on theoretical
policy analysis. It also provided a new perspective on actual policy experience, such as
the stagﬂation problem. The analysis showed that a sustained high rate of inﬂation may
not be the consequence of irrational policy decisions; it might simply reﬂect an inability of
policymakers to commit to monetary policy. This insight shifted the focus of policy analysis
2from the study of individual policy decisions to the design of institutions that mitigate the
time consistency problem. Indeed, the reforms of central banks undertaken in many countries
as of the early 1990s have their roots in the research initiated by Kydland and Prescott.
Arguably, these reforms are an important factor underlying the recent period of low and
stable inﬂation. More broadly, the insight that time inconsistency is a general problem for
economic policymaking has shifted the focus not only towards normative research on the
optimal design of institutions such as central banks, but also towards positive research on
the interaction between economic decision-making and political institutions. It has inspired a
large cross-disciplinary literature at the intersection between economics and political science.
“Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations”, from 1982, proposed a theory of business
cycle ﬂuctuations far from the Keynesian tradition. In this article, Kydland and Prescott
integrated the analyses of long-run economic growth and short-run macroeconomic ﬂuctu-
ations, by maintaining that a crucial determinant of long-run living standards, i.e., growth
in technology, can also generate short-run cycles. Moreover, rather than emphasizing the
inability of markets to coordinate supply and demand, Kydland and Prescott’s business cy-
cle model relied on standard microeconomic mechanisms whereby prices, wages, and interest
rates enable markets to clear. They thus argued that periods of temporarily low output
growth need not be a result of market failures, but could simply follow from temporarily
slow improvements in production technologies.
Kydland and Prescott showed that many qualitative features of actual business cycles,
such as the co-movements of central macroeconomic variables and their relative variabili-
ties, can be generated by a model based on supply (technology) shocks. Using ﬂuctuations
in technology growth of the same magnitude as those measured from data, Kydland and
Prescott also demonstrated that their simple model could generate quantitatively signiﬁcant
cycles. It thus appeared that technology shocks should be taken seriously as a cause of
business cycles.
From a methodological point of view, Kydland and Prescott’s article answered Lucas’s
call for an alternative to the Keynesian paradigm. It was the ﬁrst study to characterize the
general equilibrium of a full-ﬂedged dynamic and stochastic macroeconomic model based on
microeconomic foundations. This required solving a set of interrelated dynamic optimization
problems, where consumers and ﬁrms make decisions based on current and expected future
paths for prices and policy variables, and where the equilibrium price sequences are such
that private-sector decisions are consistent with clearing markets at all points in time and
all states of the world. Kydland and Prescott showed that this challenging analysis could
be carried out in practice by extensive use of numerical methods. Their empirical approach
relied on model simulation, based on so-called “calibration”, and on comparing the synthetic
data from simulations with actual data. Such calibration can be regarded as a simple form of
estimation, where model parameters are assigned values so as to match the model’s long-run
macroeconomic features with those in the data and render the behavior of individual agents
in the model consistent with empirical microeconomic studies.
Kydland and Prescott’s work on business cycles initiated an extensive research program.
Successively more sophisticated dynamic models of business cycles have been formulated,
solved numerically, and compared to data using both calibration methods and econometric
3estimation. Kydland and Prescott’s emphasis on supply shocks led researchers to reconsider
the origins of business cycles and assess the relative importance of diﬀerent shocks. Their
results were established for well-functioning markets, while subsequent research considered
various market imperfections and examined their implications. As a result of these eﬀorts,
current state-of-the-art business-cycle models give prominence to both supply and demand
shocks. These models rely on explicit microeconomic foundations to a much larger extent
than did earlier Keynesian models. For example, so-called “new-Keynesian” models, which
have become a standard tool for analyzing monetary policy, have a core similar to Kydland
and Prescott’s original model, but incorporatef r i c t i o n si nt h ef o r mo f“ s t i c k y ”p r i c e sa n d
wages.
Kydland and Prescott’s two articles have central themes in common. Both articles view
t h em a c r o e c o n o m ya sad y n a m i cs y s t e m ,w h e r ea g e n t s – p r i v a t ea g e n t sa n dp o l i c y m a k e r s –
make rational, forward-looking, and interrelated decisions. Both articles provide insights
into postwar developments in the world economy, in terms of private-sector or government
behavior. Both articles oﬀer a new perspective on good macroeconomic policy, leading to a
reconsideration of policymaking institutions and a diﬀerent approach to stabilization policy.
Separately, each of the articles spawned a large independent literature. In the following, we
describe the contributions in more detail.
2 Time consistency of economic policy
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, macroeconomic research paid particular attention to the
expectations held by private agents. A ﬁrst step was to emphasize expectations as important
determinants of economic outcomes. Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968) based their
natural-rate theories of unemployment on the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, where
the relationship between actual inﬂation and unemployment depends on expected inﬂation.
A second step was to study expectations formation in more depth. Lucas (1972, 1973)
based his analysis on the rational-expectations hypothesis, according to which economic
agents make the best possible forecasts of future economic events given available information,
including knowledge of how the economy functions, and where the best possible forecast
presumes that other agents act according to the same principle, now and in the future.
Kydland and Prescott’s analysis of economic policy design added a new dimension to
expectations formation. Their model endogenized government decision-making by assuming
that governments choose policy in order to maximize the welfare of their citizens. Kydland
and Prescott followed Lucas in assuming that the private sector’s expectations about fu-
ture government policy are rational; they also followed Friedman and Phelps in assuming
that those expectations are important determinants of economic outcomes. Under these as-
sumptions, Kydland and Prescott showed–by way of a general argument as well as speciﬁc
examples–that government policymaking is subject to a time consistency problem.
Kydland and Prescott’s 1977 paper contained several related contributions, both method-
ological and substantive. First, they pointed to the general origin of the time consistency
problem: without a commitment mechanism for future policy, the government faces an ad-
ditional constraint in policymaking because its policy has to be credible. In other words,
4if private expectations about future policy choices are rational, a certain set of economic
outcomes are simply not attainable under discretionary policy. Second, they derived the
policy outcomes that would result in this case if both private agents and policymakers act
rationally. They characterized time-consistent equilibria without commitment and demon-
strated that such equilibria involve lower welfare than those with government commitment.
Third, they argued that more or less unalterablep o l i c yr u l e sm a yb ec a l l e df o r .T h i si n i t i -
ated a discussion about institutional design aimed at creating commitment mechanisms that
enlarge the set of feasible economic outcomes and improve economic well-being. In all these
ways, Kydland and Prescott’s contribution has fundamentally changed the way we think
about economic policy.
2.1 The general idea
The following simple and abstract model with two time periods, t−1 and t,s u ﬃces for
describing the problem. In period t − 1, a government wants to attain the best possible
outcome for economic agents in period t. Economic outcomes in period t depend not only
on the policy undertaken in period t, but also on private-sector decisions made in period t−1
(determining, for example, savings or wages in period t). Private-sector decisions in period
t−1 depend on expectations about the period-t policy. These expectations are rationally
formed. In period t−1, private-sector agents understand the determinants of government
policy in period t and base their forecasts on this knowledge. There is no uncertainty in
the model, so that rational expectations imply perfect foresight on the part of private-sector
agents.
In the case with commitment, the government chooses its period-t policy in period t−1,
without the ability to change this policy later on. Clearly then, the optimal choice of period-t
p o l i c yh a st ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n ti t se ﬀects on private-sector decisions in period t−1. Because
the equilibrium period-t policy pins down the expectations in period t−1 as to what this
policy will be, it inﬂuences private-sector decisions made in period t−1 that aﬀect period-t
economic outcomes.
In the more realistic case without commitment, i.e., with discretionary policy, in period
t−1 the government cannot make binding decisions over policy in period t until period
t arrives. In this case, by contrast, the period-t p o l i c yc h o i c ew i l ln o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
how private-sector decisions are made in period t−1, because when this policy choice is
undertaken, private-sector decisions in period t−1 have already been made and can no
longer be inﬂuenced. This will generally lead to diﬀerent period-t policy choices than in
the commitment case. As a result, economic outcomes will lead to lower welfare than under
commitment. This follows from the fact that with rational expectations, policy in period
t is perfectly anticipated, but owing to the time sequencing of decision-making, there is no
way for the government to inﬂuence these expectations. When deciding its policy in period
t, the government thus solves an optimization problem that does not consider all the eﬀects
of its policy choice.
To see how time inconsistency arises in this example, suppose a government that cannot
make commitments in period t−1 announces an intention to adopt the same period-t policy
as the optimal policy it would (hypothetically) have selected under commitment. This an-
5nouncement would not be credible, because when period t arrives and the government makes
its actual policy choice, it would discover that it is optimal to renege on its announcement.
2.2 Methods
Given the problem at hand, the government’s policymaking problem cannot be analyzed
as an optimal-control problem, as in conventional macroeconomics. In an optimal control
problem, the optimizer chooses a control-variable sequence that maximizes an objective func-
tion subject to constraints. But in Kydland and Prescott’s setup the dependence of private
behavior on (rational) private expectations about policy makes the constraints endogenous.
These constraints describe relations between current policy and current economic outcomes
that–via private-sector expectations–are inﬂuenced by future policy choices. This ne-
cessitates the use of game-theoretic methods in order to determine equilibrium outcomes.
Kydland and Prescott used diﬀerent equilibrium concepts in the diﬀerent models and ex-
amples appearing in their paper. In one, they used the equilibrium concept proposed by
Nash (1950). Another model solution was based on sequential rationality, close to Selten’s
(1965) subgame-perfect equilibrium, where the expectations of all agents–all private agents
as well as the government–are consistent with future equilibrium behavior, regardless of the
choices made today. In games with a ﬁnite time horizon, such a solution can be found by
backwards induction. Kydland and Prescott also studied a model example with an inﬁnite
time horizon showing how to use recursive methods. Such methods are particularly useful
for deﬁning a special type of equilibria, so-called Markov-perfect equilibria, where current
actions are time-invariant functions of payoﬀ-relevant variables only.1
2.3 Examples and applications
Kydland and Prescott dealt informally with several examples of time inconsistency. They
pointed out that government assistance in protection against natural disasters, such as ﬂoods
and earthquakes, may not be optimal ex ante, whereas it is optimal ex post. Suppose that an
uninhabited area is likely to be aﬀected by tropical storms, and that this risk is so high that
it is not socially desirable from an ex-ante perspective for the population to settle there. The
necessary protective assistance, which only the government can undertake, is too costly. The
q u e s t i o nt h e ni sw h a ta c t i o nt h eg o v e r n m e n tw o u l du n d e r t a k ei ft h ea r e ai si nf a c ts e t t l e d :
either it assists settlers in constructing protective devices to limit losses in the event of a
storm, or it refrains. When it is socially desirable to provide protection ex post, there is a
time consistency problem. If the government can commit to not providing such assistance in
the event the area is settled, the citizens will simply not settle there and the socially desirable
outcome is attained. If, on the other hand, the government cannot commit, there will be
settlement, since the citizens then know that they will receive assistance and protection, and
a socially less desirable outcome is obtained.
1In a stationary model with an inﬁnite time horizon, a Markov-perfect equilibrium is formally found as a
ﬁxed point in function space: the equilibrium strategy (rule) has to represent optimal current behavior when
expectations of future behavior areg i v e nb yt h es a m er u l e .U n d e ra ni n ﬁnite time horizon, other types of
equilibria are also possible. For a more detailed discussion, see Maskin and Tirole (2001).
6Another example concerns the protection of patents for technological innovations. Sup-
pose a government can commit regarding the extent to which it will protect patents in the
future. It can then optimally balance the negative eﬀects of monopoly power for the inno-
vators receiving the patents, against the beneﬁts of creating incentives for innovation so as
to obtain ex-post monopoly power. If the government cannot commit, however, the relevant
incentives for innovation will not be taken into consideration.
In addition to an abstract general model, Kydland and Prescott’s formal analysis treated
two cases: tax policy and stabilization (inﬂation) policy. Here, we ﬁrst consider a tax-policy
problem, similar in spirit to Kydland and Prescott’s but simpliﬁed for expositional reasons.2
We then turn to Kydland and Prescott’s own example of stabilization policy.
2.3.1 Optimal taxation
A government taxes a large number of identical consumers in order to ﬁnance a given level of
(per capita) expenditures, G. This government has access to two tax bases, capital income,
K, and labor income, L, and takes into account the distortions caused by taxation.3 Each of
the (per-capita) tax bases in period t depends negatively on the tax rate that applies to it:
K(θt) and L(τt),w h e r eθt and τt are the tax rates on capital and labor income, respectively,
are both decreasing functions.4 The government budget constraint can thus be stated as
θtK(θt)+τtL(τt)=G.
Next, assume that private agents decide on the supply of capital in period t − 1,w h e r e a s
they decide on the supply of labor in period t. We consider two cases.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ns e tt h et a xr a t e sθt and τt already in period
t − 1, i.e., with full commitment. Optimal behavior, provided that the government wants
to maximize the representative consumer’s equilibrium utility, follows Ramsey’s well-known
elasticity principle. In particular, the optimal tax rates can be solved from the government’s







where  x is the elasticity of x with respect to its own (net-of-tax) price:  x ≡ (dx/x)/(dpx/px).
Intuitively, the government wants to equalize the distortion on the last unit of revenue raised
across the two tax bases, which implies that the less elastic tax base is assigned a higher tax
rate. What is particularly important here, however, is that the government’s choice of θt
and τt takes into account how the supply of capital–from the consumer’s savings in period
2The presentation here is related to Fischer (1980) and is based on Persson and Tabellini (1990).
3For simplicity, we set the prices of both capital and labor services to one.
4The assumptions on K and L can be derived from ﬁrst principles: suppose that the consumer’s (quasi-
linear) utility function reads u(ct−1)+ct+v(1−lt). Here, u and v are strictly increasing and strictly concave
functions, and 1 − lt is interpreted as leisure time, where 1 is the total time endowment. With the budget
constraints ct−1 + kt = yt−1 and ct =( 1− θt)kt +( 1− τt)lt + yt,w h e r eyt−1 and yt represent income from
other sources in periods t − 1 and t, respectively, utility maximization gives strictly decreasing capital and
labor supply functions similar to those in the text.
7t − 1–depends on the choice of θt. Thus, the Ramsey formula for tax rates represents the
optimal solution to the ex-ante taxation problem.
Suppose, by contrast, that the government cannot commit to θt and τt in advance. Given
some amount of savings from period t − 1, how will the government set tax rates in period
t, once this period arrives? The taxation problem becomes trivial and Ramsey’s principle
for taxation can be applied to the ex-post taxation problem. Since the supply of capital is
entirely inelastic at this point–capital is predetermined–all the capital income should be
taxed away before labor taxes are used! Ex post, this creates no distortions on the supply of
capital and mitigates distortions on the supply of labor. Because income from capital has a
diﬀerent elasticity ex ante than ex post, the commitment solution is not time consistent. If
the government were given a chance to re-optimize in period t, it would change the ex-ante
optimal plan. Thus, there is a credibility problem: in period t − 1, the government cannot
just announce the tax rates that solve the problem under commitment and hope that the
private sector will believe the announcement.
What is the time-consistent solution when both the government and private agents are
rational? Applying the requirement of sequential rationality discussed in Section 2.2, no
m a t t e rh o wm u c hi ss a v e di np e r i o dt − 1, the decisions of the government and the private
sector have to be optimal in period t.S u p p o s e t h a t G is suﬃciently large, i.e., that labor
taxation is always necessary in order to ﬁnance the government’s expenditures. Then, ratio-
nality in period t dictates that the ex-post tax rate on capital is 100 percent. As a result, all
consumers choose zero savings in period t − 1: rational expectations of government policy
choice in t tells them that any savings are wasted from their perspective. It follows that, for
any amount of private savings,
0+τtL(τt)=G,
which can be used to solve for the tax rate on labor in period t.5 Clearly, this outcome
is worse than the outcome under commitment (as both tax rates are higher, the utility of
consumers must be lower).
2.3.2 Optimal stabilization policy
Consider a monetary policymaker who faces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemploy-
ment. Private-sector behavior is represented by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
Unemployment in period t, ut,i sg i v e nb y
ut = u
∗ − α(πt − E(πt)),
where u∗ is the equilibrium (natural) rate of unemployment, πt is the inﬂation rate between
periods t−1 and t, E(πt) is the inﬂation rate expected by the private sector in period t−1,
and α is a positive exogenous parameter. This is a reduced-form relation which could be
motivated, for example, by assuming that (i) the demand for labor depends negatively (and
therefore unemployment depends positively) on the real wage in period t; and (ii) nominal
wage contracts are set in advance–in period t−1–based on expectations of period-t prices.
5I ng e n e r a l ,( a tl e a s t )t w ov a l u e so fτt solve the equation τtL(τt)=G. As the government optimizes, it
will choose the lowest of these on the upward-sloping portion of the “Laﬀer curve”.
8Then, higher-than-expected inﬂation lowers the real wage, labor demand increases, and
unemployment falls.
The policymaker’s objective is to maximize the function
S(ut,πt),
where S is weakly decreasing and concave in each argument and has a maximum at the
point where ut <u ∗ and πt =0 .6 The indiﬀerence curves representing equal values of S are
shown in Figure 1 (taken from Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The literature has subsequently












where γ represents the weight the policymaker assigns to inﬂation (relative to unemployment)
and k<1 represents some distortion that makes the government target an unemployment
rate lower than the equilibrium rate.7
The policymaker can use monetary policy in period t to control πt. Without uncertainty,
as assumed here, rational expectations on the part of the private sector imply E(πt)=πt.
Therefore, actual unemployment always equals equilibrium unemployment, i.e., ut = u∗.
If, in period t−1, the policymaker can commit to the inﬂation rate in period t, then the
optimal policy is obvious. Since ut = u∗ must hold, the policymaker will choose πt =0 .T h e
ex-ante optimal outcome (u∗,0) is illustrated in Figure 1 as point O.
The commitment outcome, however, is not time consistent. Ex post, when expectations
have already been formed (nominal wages are predetermined when the government chooses
period-t inﬂation), the government ﬁnds it optimal to choose an inﬂation rate higher than
0 if it is allowed to change its zero-inﬂation plan. An inﬂationary policy will reduce un-
employment, which by assumption raises welfare.8 Ex post, optimal policy is dictated by
the condition α · ∂S/∂u = ∂S/∂π:t h ei n ﬂation rate is increased to the level at which the
marginal gain from lower unemployment equals the marginal cost of higher inﬂation. This
outcome, characterized by an “inﬂation bias", is labeled C in Figure 1.
Using the parametric form of the model, it is easily shown that equilibrium inﬂation





Thus, inﬂation is higher when the diﬀerence between the policymaker’s unemployment target
and the equilibrium rate is larger (k lower, or u∗ higher), the weight it assigns to inﬂation is
6Kydland and Prescott’s assumption that a zero inﬂation rate is optimal is not essential for the conclusions.
7This formulation was ﬁrst used by Barro and Gordon (1983a).
8The key assumption required here is that the marginal welfare gain from lowering unemployment below
u∗ should exceed the marginal welfare loss from raising inﬂation above zero; for the functional form given,
the former is strictly positive and the latter is zero (to the ﬁrst order).
9This expression is derived by using the ﬁrst-order condition, when the government takes E(πt) as given,
i.e., γπt = α(ut −ku∗). Combining this condition with the Phillips curve ut = u∗ −α(πt −E(πt)) and using
the rational expectations condition πt = E(πt), one arrives at the expression in the text.
9lower (γ lower), or the responsiveness of unemployment to real wages is greater (α higher).
Policymakers who care a great deal about unemployment, but little about inﬂation, thus
end up without lower unemployment, but with higher inﬂation, than do policymakers with
a stronger preference for low inﬂation relative to low unemployment. This striking result
is entirely due to the lack of commitment. Under commitment, the ex-post temptation to
inﬂate is absent, and rational expectations dictate the same outcome for any preference
parameters.
2.4 Subsequent research
Kydland and Prescott’s contribution oﬀered a politico-economic explanation as to why many
countries found themselves in a process of self-generating inﬂation despite repeated promises
to combat it. In particular, Barro and Gordon (1983a) expressed and elaborated further on
this view. Based on Kydland and Prescott’s analysis, they formulated a positive theory of
monetary policy and inﬂation. According to this theory, inﬂation is higher when equilibrium
unemployment is higher relative to the unemployment target that politicians try, but are
not able, to attain.
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) also introduced supply shocks and stabilization policy into
the model and showed that these extensions did not alter the basic conclusions. In the
extended model, a prior commitment to adhere to a certain policy should be interpreted as
commitment to a rule that makes policy respond optimally to future macroeconomic shocks.
Such a (contingent) rule leads to better macroeconomic outcomes than discretionary policy:
it delivers lower inﬂation and the same average unemployment rate over the cycle, as well as
the same extent of macroeconomic stabilization.
A challenging issue in research as well as in practice was whether the time-consistency
problem could be resolved. One possibility was oﬀered by Barro and Gordon (1983b), Backus
and Driﬃll (1985), and Tabellini (1985). These authors borrowed insights from the theory of
repeated games to show that, under some conditions, equilibria with low inﬂation could also
arise under discretionary policymaking. According to this theory, when monetary policy-
m a k e r si n v e s ti na“ g o o dr e p u t a t i o n ”b yc o m b a t t i n gi n ﬂation, they inﬂuence private-sector
expectations regarding future inﬂation rates.
Kydland and Prescott also pointed to the potential beneﬁt of legislated rules that would
introduce a time lag between policy decisions and their implementation (similar to the lag
often applied to constitutional change). An apparent drawback of such rules is that, in prac-
tice, they would have to be quite simple; this would make it diﬃcult to react to unforeseen
macroeconomic events that required a policy response. Thus, simple, non-contingent rules
for monetary policy, such as rules prescribing a ﬁxed rate of inﬂation or a ﬁxed exchange rate,
may be less desirable than discretionary policy because the ﬂuctuations in output under the
simple rule would become too large. These problems prompted other researchers to focus on
institutional reforms that would improve the performance of discretionary policymaking.
In the context of monetary policy, Rogoﬀ (1985) demonstrated that a proper balance
between credibility (of low-inﬂation policy) and ﬂexibility (stabilization) could be achieved
through delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. In particular, ac-
c o r d i n gt oR o g o ﬀ’s analysis, if an independent central bank is managed by a “conservative”
10central banker–i.e., an agent who is more inﬂation averse than citizens in general–then
better welfare outcomes can be achieved. In the language of the stabilization policy example
above, an agent with a higher γ than in the social welfare function of society should be
selected to head and independently run the central bank. This ﬁnding has been used in the
practical policy debate in many countries to recommend the independence of central banks
from direct government inﬂuence. The theoretical presumption–that it should be possible
to reduce inﬂation through such institutional reform without any cost in terms of increased
average unemployment over the business cycle–has received support from empirical re-
search examining the eﬀects of monetary policy institutions on macroeconomic outcomes
both across countries and over time.10
Rogoﬀ’s idea has since been developed and reﬁned substantially, for example in analyses of
monetary regimes with explicit inﬂation targets and incentive contracts for central bankers
(e.g., Walsh, 1995 and Svensson, 1997). The literature has also considered a number of
extensions of the economic environment from a simple Phillips curve to dynamic models of
the macroeconomy. Much of the recent literature has focused on time consistency problems
associated with eﬀorts to use monetary policy for the purpose of stabilizing inﬂation and
unemployment around their target values. Such problems also arise when monetary policy
is not characterized by a general inﬂation bias. Some of these models have analyzed the
potential for counteracting temporary increases in inﬂation with lower costs in terms of lost
output and employment if future low-inﬂation policies are credible (see, e.g., Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler, 1999, for a survey of this research). Many of these applications are based on
Kydland and Prescott’s methods for characterizing equilibria. Other aspects of the design of
monetary institutions, such as the transparency and accountability properties of alternative
institutions, have also been analyzed from the stepping stone of Kydland and Prescott’s
insights.
Time consistency problems have also been examined in other areas of government pol-
icymaking. Important early examples in the literature on ﬁscal policy are Fischer’s (1980)
analysis of the taxation of capital and labor as well as Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) analysis of
government debt and the timing of taxes. Subsequent theoretical and empirical research has
studied how balanced-budget rules or other restrictions on ﬁscal policy inﬂuence government
spending, budget deﬁcits, and international indebtedness.
More generally, a vibrant literature has developed in the area of political economics, bor-
rowing insights and methods from Kydland and Prescott’s work. This research program
extends the analysis of credibility problems to issues of political incentives and political in-
stitutions as central determinants of policy outcomes. Signiﬁcant cross-disciplinary work
has incorporated ideas and tools from political science to analyze conﬂicts of interest be-
tween voters and policymakers, and between diﬀerent groups of voters or political parties
(Kydland and Prescott’s examples all view the private sector through the lens of identical–
“representative”–individuals). This area of research extends far beyond stabilization and
taxation policy, dealing with trade policy, regulation policy, labor-market policy, economic
growth, and so on. Several recent books, aimed at graduate students in economics and po-
10See, e.g., Grilli, Masciandro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), and Alesina and Summers (1993),
for early empirical analyses.
11litical science as well as active researchers in the area, summarize this body of research (see,
e.g., Drazen, 2000, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, and Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
2.5 Broader impact
Kydland and Prescott’s analysis of the time consistency problems inherent in monetary pol-
icy provides an explanation as to why many countries appeared to be trapped in a vicious
spiral of high inﬂation during the 1970s, despite continuous declarations from governments
and central banks that inﬂation would be brought down. Kydland and Prescott’s recom-
mendation that policies should be rules-based rather than discretionary sparked a debate,
where simple rules for money growth, ﬁxed exchange rates, etc., were suggested as solutions
to the inﬂation problem. Following the academic literature reviewed above, the practical
policy debate also changed focus. Discussions of isolated policy actions gave away to explicit
consideration of the broad institutional framework shaping the incentives of policymakers
and thus determining which policies would be credible and politically feasible.
Since the early 1990s, a number of countries have pursued radical institutional reforms of
their monetary policy frameworks, especially by increasing the independence of their central
banks regarding the operational conduct of policy to achieve the objectives set forth by
the political system. At the same time, these objectives have been stated more clearly,
usually with price stability as the primary goal. Central bank reforms in countries such as
New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom drew extensively on the conclusions from
the academic literature initiated by Kydland and Prescott, as did discussions about the
design of the new European Central Bank, ECB, in the European Union. There is also a
close connection between the academic research on this topic and the increasing reliance on
explicit inﬂation targets among central banks in developed as well as developing countries.
2.6 Related literature
Time consistency problems in monetary policy, due to the government’s desire to raise rev-
enue from surprise inﬂation, were pointed out already in Auernheimer (1974). Calvo (1978)
examined such time consistency problems but did not derive the time-consistent solution
under discretionary decision making or analyze possible solutions. Another type of time
consistency problem appears in the literature on savings decisions initiated by Strotz (1956)
and later developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968). Here, time inconsistency enters directly
through preferences that change over time, whereas in Kydland and Prescott’s analysis,
inconsistency is embedded in the constraints.
A time consistency problem more closely related to that studied by Kydland and Prescott
may be found in Buchanan’s (1975) discussion of the “Samaritan’s dilemma”, but again with-
out a systematic formal analysis of the time consistency problem associated with government
policy. Similar problems are mentioned in Elster (1977). A related problem also appears
in the literature on price setting by a durable-goods monopolist. The idea here is that a
monopoly producer of a new good would like all consumers to believe that the good will
b ec o n t i n u e dt ob es o l da tah i g hp r i c e . C o n s umers with a high willingness to pay would
then purchase the good at the high initial price, after which it could be sold at a lower
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will occur at marginal cost because consumers are forward-looking, whereby the monopolist
actually competes in price with his future selves. Formal game-theoretic analyses of this
problem have later been provided by Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), and Gul, Sonnenschein,
and Wilson (1986).
3 The driving forces behind business cycles
The last two decades have witnessed radical changes in the theory and practice of business
cycle research, and–more generally–in the predominant views on business cycle phenom-
ena. Keynesian analysis from the early postwar period relied on a set of relationships among
aggregate variables (“reduced forms”) that were intended to “sum up” the interactions be-
tween various structural relationships. Although each such relationship was motivated by
microeconomic theory of consumer and ﬁrm behavior, it was usually not explicitly derived
from such theory. More importantly, diﬀerent macroeconomic relationships were not based
on a common microeconomic structure when used together in applied macroeconomic anal-
ysis.
Estimated versions of such business cycle models were widely used in practical forecasting
and policy-oriented evaluations of monetary and ﬁscal policy interventions. By the mid-
1970s, the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) had pointed to serious problems with this approach.
Estimated reduced-form relationships could not be expected to be robust to changes in policy
regimes or in the macroeconomic environment. Macroeconomic developments emphasized
this critique when seemingly stable macroeconomic relationships, based on historical data,
appeared to break down in the 1970s. In particular, the new stagﬂation–high unemployment
combined with high inﬂation–played havoc with the Phillips curve, which had earlier seemed
t ot r a c eo u tas t a b l en e g a t i v er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h er a t e so fi n ﬂation and unemployment.
The experiences of the 1970s also called into question the predominant idea that business
cycles are driven mainly by changes in demand. Instead, the contemporary macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations seemed to be caused largely by supply shocks, such as the drastic oil price hikes
in 1973-74 and 1979 and the worldwide slowdown in productivity growth as of the mid-1970s.
Lucas proposed formulating a new macroeconomic theory on ﬁrmer ground, i.e., on an ex-
plicit microeconomic structure instead of postulated aggregate relationships. This structure
would include assumptions about consumers and their preferences, ﬁrms and their technolo-
gies, the information of these agents, in what speciﬁc markets they interact, and so on. On
the basis of these deep parameters, general-equilibrium implications for aggregate variables
would be derived and confronted with data. Consumers’ preferences and ﬁrms’ technolo-
g i e sw e r en o tl i k e l yt ob ea ﬀected by changes in ﬁscal or monetary policy regimes or in the
macroeconomic environment, even though the behavior of consumers and ﬁrms would be
aﬀected . Hence, quantitative analysis based on microeconomic underpinnings is likely to
be more robust to such regime changes and thus more useful in policy analysis than models
based on historical aggregate relationships.
Unfortunately, Lucas’s guidelines were not accompanied by an operational prescription
for implementing them. The development of an alternative macroeconomic modelling ap-
proach, which would satisfy even the minimal requirement of deriving joint predictions for the
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task. Such a theory would have to be dynamic to properly model investment, consumption,
and other intertemporal decisions on the basis of optimal, forward-looking behavior of ﬁrms
and households. Simple dynamic models with rational expectations certainly existed and a
research program on how to econometrically estimate such models was underway, following
the pathbreaking work by Sargent (1977, 1978, 1979). These models involved drastic simpli-
ﬁcations, however, and essentially required representing the economy–or parts of it–by a
few linear relationships. Around 1980, traditional (likelihood-based) econometric estimation
of dynamic, non-linear models on a rich enough form to be operationally used in quantitative
macroeconomic analysis seemed out of reach.
Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 paper transformed macroeconomic analysis in several di-
mensions. Indeed, it provided a blueprint for rendering Lucas’s proposal operational. In their
modeling, Kydland and Prescott relied on a stochastic version of the neoclassical growth
model, which has since become the core of much macroeconomic modeling. They showed
that technology shocks, i.e., short-run variations around the positive growth trend for tech-
nology that makes economies grow in the long run, could be an important cause of output
ﬂuctuations. In today’s macroeconomic models, supply shocks typically play an important
role alongside demand shocks. In their model solution, Kydland and Prescott relied on
numerical solution and computer simulation to an extent not previously implemented in eco-
nomics. Nowadays, numerical analysis of economic models is an indispensable element in the
tool kit of graduate students in economics. In their empirical implementation, Kydland and
Prescott relied on so-called calibration, a simple but informative form of estimation when
confronting new models with data. Since then, new macroeconomic theory is frequently
compared with data using these methods. In all these ways, Kydland and Prescott’s work
changed not only the basic methodology of business cycle analysis, but also our perspective
o nt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fv a r i o u st y p e so fs h o c k sa n dt h e i rp r o p a g a t i o nm e c h a n i s m s .
3.1 The general idea
We begin by outlining the general features of Kydland and Prescott’s business cycle the-
ory. Next, we review their methodology, and outline a speciﬁcs i m p l ee x a m p l eo fm o d e l
formulation, along with a brief look at empirical implementation.
Kydland and Prescott set out to integrate business cycle theory and growth theory. Since
they viewed technology shocks as potentially important sources of short-run output ﬂuctua-
tions, it seemed natural to turn to the neoclassical growth model–the workhorse of growth
theory ever since the research of Robert Solow (1956). Another reason for using the neo-
classical growth model was related to the problem of distinguishing the “short run” (cycles)
from the “long run” (growth); as the long run, by necessity, is a sequence of short runs.
Moreover, most variables of interest in growth theory and business cycle theory coincide.
Kydland and Prescott’s starting point was the fact that the U.S. economy, and many
other Western economies as well, had grown at an average annual rate of around 2 percent
for approximately 100 years, increasing output by a factor of seven. Their hypothesis was
that technology growth might be an important determinant, not only of long-term living
standards, but also of short-term ﬂuctuations, to the extent that technology growth displays
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another tool developed by Solow (1957). Based on certain assumptions about the working of
the economy (constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and market clearing), consistent
with the model economy studied by Kydland and Prescott, this procedure accounts for the
part of output growth due to the growth of inputs (labor and capital, notably). The residual
component–the “Solow residual”–is then interpreted as technology growth. Kydland and
Prescott (1982) assumed a standard deviation for technology shocks of the same magnitude
as for the Solow residuals. Measurement based on Solow residuals implies relatively large
variations in technology growth over time, a substantial part of which appear at business
cycle frequencies. More reﬁned methods have subsequently been used (see Section 3.4 below).
Conceptually, Kydland and Prescott studied a closed-economy dynamic, stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium model with perfect competition and no market frictions. How do technology
shocks translate into output movements in this model? A positive technology shock in pe-
riod t represents a higher-than-average growth rate of total factor productivity, i.e., a large
increase in the economy’s ability to produce output from given supplies of capital and labor.
Higher productivity raises wages, so labor supply in period t increases as workers ﬁnd work
more proﬁtable than leisure. Thus, two eﬀects serve to raise period t output: the direct eﬀect
of higher productivity and the indirect eﬀect of higher labor input. The return to capital
increases as well, but the capital stock in period t is predetermined. Thus, if the technology
shock in period t had been foreseen, the implied increase in the period-t return to capital
could also have led to higher investment in previous periods, thus raising output in period t
through a third, indirect channel.
The boost in period-t output has dynamic consequences. Part of the increase in output
is consumed, while the remainder is saved and invested. The split depends on consumers’
preferences and the expected longevity of the productivity shock. Theory and microeconomic
evidence indicate a desire to smooth consumption over time, and the portion of a temporary
increase in output that is saved depends on the preference for smoothing. The less quickly
the productivity shock is expected to die out, the more proﬁt a b l ew i l li tb et os a v ea n d
invest. Kydland and Prescott based their technology growth series on the data, which feature
signiﬁcant positive autocorrelation, thus leading to an investment response to a current shock
w h i c hi sh i g h e rt h a ni ft e c h n o l o g yg r o w t hw e r eu n c o r r e l a t e do v e rt i m e .T h i sr a i s e st h ec a p i t a l
stock in period t+1, while technology is still above trend due to autocorrelation. Incentives
for higher than normal labor supply thus remain, and–if the increase in the capital stock
is large and technology shocks are suﬃciently autocorrelated–labor supply in period t +1
will be more above trend than in period t, as will investment.
These dynamic eﬀects constitute the model’s “propagation mechanism”, whereby an “im-
pulse” of a temporary technology shock shapes the path of future macroeconomic variables.
The mechanism is stable, i.e., the eﬀects of an impulse eventually die out, because the tech-
nology growth process is mean-reverting and because decreasing returns to capital bring
investment back to trend.
The theory delivers time series for macroeconomic variables broadly consistent with data.
Due to the propagation mechanism, all macroeconomic aggregates display high autocorrela-
tion and high co-movement, and the volatility of investment is higher than that of output,
which is higher than that of consumption. The economy goes through booms and busts,
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fewer hours and consumers to invest less. Calibrated with parameters from microeconomic
studies and simulated with impulses from an estimated technology growth process, Kyd-
land and Prescott’s baseline model generates output ﬂuctuations that amount to around 70
percent of those observed in postwar U.S. data.
3.2 Methods
Kydland and Prescott studied a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. An equi-
librium in the model is a stochastic process for quantities and prices such that (i) given the
price processes, consumers and ﬁrms choose quantities so as to maximize expected utility and
maximize proﬁts and (ii) markets clear. Property (i) embeds rational expectations; in a full-
ﬂedged dynamic model, unbiased predictions of the future evolution of prices is an element of
optimizing behavior. Basic theorems ensuring the existence of an equilibrium–which, math-
ematically, required solving a ﬁxed-point problem in high-dimensional space–were already
provided in the work of Arrow and Debreu (see Debreu, 1959). However, a precise charac-
terization of an equilibrium was very diﬃcult, due to the complexity of dynamic stochastic
analysis. Thus, Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 paper made several simpliﬁcations of the gen-
eral structure described by Arrow and Debreu.
Kydland and Prescott considered only one consumption good and one type of “inﬁnitely
lived” consumer (to be interpreted as a dynastic family: a sequence of parents and children
with altruistic preferences vis-à-vis oﬀspring). Moreover, as in the standard neoclassical
growth model, Kydland and Prescott assumed only one type of production technology: an
aggregate production function, based on the inputs of capital and labor. They also as-
sumed that markets are devoid of frictions, so that any equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This
facilitated matters in the sense that standard welfare theorems allowed them to ﬁnd and
characterize the equilibrium using optimization theory. Since an equilibrium delivered the
best possible outcome for the representative consumer, they could sidestep the price mech-
anism and ﬁnd the equilibrium quantities directly by solving a “social planning problem”.
Based on these quantities, the equilibrium prices were then easily retrieved from the ﬁrst-
order conditions for utility and proﬁt maximization (for details, see Section 3.3.2 below).
All of these simpliﬁcations have been examined and relaxed in the subsequent literature (see
Section 3.4).
In spite of these drastic simpliﬁcations, Kydland and Prescott found it necessary to use
numerical analysis to characterize the equilibrium. In so doing, they adapted available in-
sights in numerical analysis to the problem at hand and used computer-aided model solution.
Today’s state-of-the-art business cycle models are substantially more complex than that an-
alyzed by Kydland and Prescott, and the numerical analysis of economic models has evolved
into a subﬁeld of its own in economics.11
Comparison of the model to data was another challenging task. A standard econometric
approach, i.e., to choose the model’s parameters so as to obtain the best possible ﬁtt ot h e
business cycle data, could not really be used due to the complexity of the model. To generate
model output for even one set of parameter values was quite diﬃcult and time-consuming,
11For references and an overview, see Amman, Kendrick, and Rust (1996).
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search among sets of parameter values in order to obtain the best ﬁt was deemed infeasi-
ble. Instead, Kydland and Prescott adopted the method of “calibration”. They selected
parameter values to match a subset of moments in the data in a way that did not require
solution of the entire stochastic model. In particular, they chose parameter values to match
certain long-run macroeconomic statistics (such as average postwar interest rates and aver-
age capital-output ratios) and microeconomic data (which allowed the parameterization of
preferences).
The idea of choosing parameters in accordance with some “basic facts”, rather than the
business cycle properties the model was designed to explain, motivated the term calibration.
Clearly, calibration is a simple form of estimation, since the model parameters are chosen in
a well-speciﬁed algorithm to ﬁt a subset of the overall data; in this case, the estimation is
based on microeconomic and (long-run) macroeconomic data.12 However, the method was
very practical. It allowed parameterization without solving the full model and it gave clear
and useful directions as to whether speciﬁc changes in the model could better explain the
data.13 Nowadays, given the advances in computer technology and econometric methods,
structural estimation of this class of business cycle models can be carried out and is actively
pursued by business cycle analysts (see Section 3.4 below).
3.3 Examples and applications
We now describe in detail a simple special case of Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 setup, while
brieﬂy pointing out how their more general model diﬀers from this special case.14
3.3.1 The setup
Time is discrete and inﬁnite: 0,1,2,.... There is one type of output good at each date, yt,
which can be used for consumption or investment: ct + it = yt. Capital accumulation obeys
kt+1 =( 1−δ)kt +it: one unit of investment at t adds to the capital stock at t+1and then
depreciates at a constant rate δ.15 Output is produced from capital and labor according
to the production function f: yt = f(zt,k t,l t). Here, f is increasing and concave and is
homogeneous of degree one in k and l. The stochastic technology parameter, zt ,f o l l o w sa n
AR(1) process, zt+1 = ρzt + εt+1,w h e r eρ ∈ (0,1) indicates positive autocorrelation and εt
is identically and independently distributed over time with zero mean and positive variance
denoted σ2.16
12Early applications of similar methodologies, although typically in static models, can be found in the
empirical literature on international trade (see Shoven and Whalley, 1984). Dynamic models were used in
public ﬁnance (see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987).
13Long-run averages in Kydland and Prescott’s stochastic model are approximately equal to the long-run
averages in the non-stochastic version of the model, which are straightforward to solve for analytically.
14A version of this special case was examined in a multi-sectoral context by Long and Plosser (1983).
15Kydland and Prescott assumed a so-called “time-to-build” technology, according to which it takes longer
than one period for investments to mature into productive capital.
16The formulation here describes a process where the technology level and population size do not exhibit
growth. This is convenient for purposes of illustration, but it is straightforward to allow for positive trends
in technology and population.
17There is a large number of (identical) consumers, so each consumer chooses quantities and
takes prices as given. Each consumer is inﬁnitely lived and derives utility from consumption






where β, the discount factor, is positive and less than unity reﬂecting a preference for current
consumption, and where u is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. The total
time endowment is 1 and lt i st h et i m es p e n tw o r k i n g .T h ev a r i a b l e syt, ct,a n ds oo n ,a r e
stochastic–they are driven by the stochastic process for technology zt–and E denotes the
expectations operator.
The consumer’s budget constraint reads
ct + kt+1 =( 1+rt − δ)kt + wtlt,
where rt is the market return to capital before depreciation and wt t h ew a g er a t e .P r i c e si n
this model are thus given by the stochastic processes for rt and wt. The consumer maximizes
the utility function subject to the budget constraint holding at all dates.
Firms maximize proﬁts under perfect competition. Given that the consumers determine
capital accumulation, this implies solving the static optimization problem of choosing kt and
lt to maximize f(zt,k t,l t)−rtkt−wtlt. Because f is homogeneous of degree one, equilibrium
proﬁts are zero in all time periods..
3.3.2 Analysis
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for consumer and ﬁrm optimization govern how the
model works. Consumers have an intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition which determines the
consumption-savings choice:
u1(ct,1 − lt)=βE[u1(ct+1,1 − lt+1)(1 + rt+1 − δ)].
The marginal utility loss of lower consumption in period t must equal the expected discounted
value of the return to higher investment, in terms of next period’s utility. Consumers also
have an intratemporal condition which delivers the labor-leisure choice:
u1(ct,1 − lt)wt = u2(ct,1 − lt).
The marginal loss of working one more unit of time in terms of lost leisure (the right-hand
side) must thus equal the wage times the marginal utility gain of higher earnings.
Firms’ proﬁt maximization conditions simply state that marginal products equal real
factor prices: rt = f2(zt,k t,l t) and wt = f3(zt,k t,l t). Thus, these prices are easy to ﬁnd as a
function of the input quantities and the current value of the technology parameter.
The equilibrium of this model takes the form of stochastic processes for quantities and
prices that satisfy all the equilibrium conditions. As in their work on time consistency,
Kydland and Prescott used recursive analysis whereby equilibrium processes are expressed
18as functions of the economy’s “state variable”, which in this case is (zt,k t): the current
shock and capital stock. The equilibrium solution for labor will be given by a function hl:
lt = hl(zt,k t). Thus, this function tells us how much labor will be supplied in equilibrium
for any value of the current shock and any value of the capital stock. We let hc denote
the solution for consumption: ct = hc(zt,k t). The two functions hl and hc are suﬃcient for
describing the equilibrium. As an example, if the current state is (zt,k t), the capital stock
in period t+1must satisfy kt+1 =( 1−δ)kt +f(zt,k t,h l(zt,k t))−hc(zt,k t), which is itself a
function only of the current state. As another example, the wage rate in period t must equal
f3(zt,k t,h l(zt,k t)), which is also a function only of the current state.
In general, it is not possible to ﬁnd explicit forms for hl and hc. The next step in
the analysis is therefore to use numerical analysis in order to approximate these functions
under some suitable speciﬁc parametric-form assumptions on f and u a n do nt h er e m a i n i n g
parameters of the model.
In a very special case of the model, it is possible to obtain a full analytical (as opposed
to numerical) characterization of the equilibrium. If




and δ =1 , then it can be veriﬁed that all the equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed when labor
supply is constant over time, i.e., hl(zt,k t)=A, and consumption is a constant fraction of
output–so that hc(zt,k t)=Bztkα
t A1−α–for some constants A and B.17
Model output from the speciﬁc case which allows a closed-form solution is not directly
comparable to business cycle data, because the assumption of full depreciation implies that
a period in the model is very long. In the data, physical capital depreciates at a rate on the
order of 10 percent per year, and full depreciation occurs after perhaps 20 years. Business
cycle models require the period length to be much shorter, and the typical assumption has
been to let a period be a quarter, or a year. Moreover, although the special case of the
model has a propagation mechanism similar to that discussed in Section 3.1, labor supply
does not respond to shocks. But if the rate of depreciation is assigned a realistic value
(which necessitates using numerical model solution), then a labor supply mechanism with
the properties discussed above appears.
3.3.3 Calibration
We have already touched on the importance of speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r sf o rt h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h e
model. As outlined above, Kydland and Prescott did not us an econometric approach, but
instead chose to calibrate their model. That is, they chose all the parameters based on
microeconomic data and long-run macroeconomic data, rather the business cycle frequencies
in the data. How, then, does the procedure of calibration work in the case of this model?18
As already indicated, the length of a time period has to be set and, typically, a time period in
17To show this, simply insert the asserted functional forms for consumption and labor into the ﬁrst-order
conditions and verify that these conditions hold at all points in time.
18For details on the calibration undertaken, see, e.g., Prescott (1986).
19the model is interpreted to represent one quarter. Following Kydland and Prescott, long-run
data (for example, postwar averages from the U.S. if the model is intended to describe this
economy) are then used for the following variables: the average capital-output ratio (about 8,
when output is measured on a quarterly basis, which helps pin down the rate of depreciation
δ), the average quarterly real interest rate (about 0.015, which pins down the discount rate
β), the average capital share of income (about 0.35, which pins down the coeﬃcient α in the
production function), and the average amount of hours worked (about 0.2 as a fraction of
total hours, which pins down the weight on leisure in utility φ i nt h ec a s eo ft h el o g a r i t h m i c
utility function).
In other words, a version of the equilibrium conditions is used where all variables grow at
a constant rate over time–to depict a long-run, or “steady-state”, situation. The parameter
values are then solved for, given the above long-run statistics. Typically, a somewhat more
general utility function than the logarithmic function is considered. This permits parame-
terization of the curvatures with respect to consumption and leisure such that elasticities
of intertemporal substitution and labor supply conform to those obtained in microeconomic
studies. Finally, the key parameters of the technology process, z, are chosen to conform to
the properties of an estimated process for the Solow residual, matching ρ to its ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation and (the variance of) ε to its variance.
3.3.4 Quantitative evaluation
Once, all of the parameter values have been assigned, the model is fully speciﬁed and can be
solved numerically. Given the solution for the equilibrium functions hl and hc, output and
other variables of interest can be simulated by selecting an initial capital stock and drawing
stochastic shocks from their given statistical distribution, while using the functions hl and hc
to generate series for all variables of interest. These series can then be compared to business
cycle data.
As an illustration, consider the setup exempliﬁed above, which is also analyzed in Cooley
and Prescott (1995).19 The calibration is carried out as outlined, where the functional form
for utility is u(c,l)=
(c1−φlφ)1−γ−1
1−γ . This form implies that the consumer’s attitudes toward
risk–as deﬁned by the “coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion”–is constant over time and equal
to γ. As in the general discussion above, φ is determined on the basis of time-use studies.
The parameter γ is chosen on the basis of microeconomic studies of risk-taking. The studies
discussed in Prescott (1986) suggest a value for γ around 1, which in fact implies that the
utility function reduces to the logarithmic function above. Next, in line with the results of
growth accounting, the process for technology shocks is taken to have a serial correlation
coeﬃcient (ρ above) of 0.95 and a standard deviation (σ above) of 0.7 percent.
The data are quarterly data from the postwar U.S. economy.20 Prior to comparing the
simulated output from the model to data, the business cycle component of the data has
to be extracted. Business cycles are normally thought of as ﬂuctuations around a growth
19The framework here and in Cooley and Prescott (1995) are identical except that the latter study allows
long-run growth in population and technology. Because these factors only have a marginal inﬂuence on the
results, they are omitted here.
20T h es a m p l eb e g i n si nt h eﬁrst quarter of 1954 and ends with the second quarter of 1991.
20Some statistics from the model (data)
Output Consumption Investment Hours Labor productivity
Percent standard deviations
1.35 (1.72) 0.33 (0.86) 5.95 (8.24) 0.77 (1.59) 0.61 (0.55)
Correlation with output
1 (1) 0.84 (0.83) 0.99 (0.91) 0.86 (0.99) 0.98 (0.03)
Table 1
path that occur with a frequency of three-ﬁve years.21 Thus, the data are “de-trended”, or
“ﬁltered”, so as to suppress their low-frequency (trend) components, while retaining those
in the business cycle range. This can be accomplished in several ways. Cooley and Prescott
(1995) used a form of diﬀerence ﬁlter.22 Some key statistics of the de-trended data from
their study and the associated model output are summarized in Table 1.23
The table shows that the variation in output in the model is somewhat lower than in the
U.S. data, but the discrepancy is not large. The model predicts that consumption varies much
less and investment much more than output. This is a result of consumption smoothing.
The variation in hours in the model is less than half of that in the data. This discrepancy
is largely due to the ﬂuctuation in the number of employed workers in the data; the simple
model here focuses on variations in the number of hours worked per worker (the intensive
margin) and abstracts from variations in labor-force participation and unemployment (the
extensive margin). Productivity in the model varies somewhat more than the measure of
productivity found in the data, which is based on average compensation per hour.
The table also shows strikingly high correlations between output and other macroeco-
nomic variables. The reason is that there is only one shock–one source of uncertainty–in
the model. The correlations between consumption and output and between investment and
output are quite similar in the model and in the data. As for the correlation between hours
and output, the model does not generate a co-movement as high as that observed in the U.S.
economy. This is another consequence of the rudimentary modeling of labor supply in this
21See, e.g., Burns and Mitchell (1946).
22The speciﬁc ﬁlter used is the one introduced in Hodrick and Prescott (1980).
23The model was simulated 100 times, each with a sample length of 150 time periods. The numbers in
the table are averages across simulations. The series for output, consumption, and investment are based
on real (1982$) quantities; output is GNP, consumption is consumption on nondurables and services, and
investment is gross private domestic investment. Hours are total hours of work based on the U.S. Household
Survey. As in the model, labor productivity equals average total compensation per hour, measured from the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
21simple model. Hourly compensation is around zero in the data whereas the model generates
a correlation close to one. This again reﬂects that the model has only one shock and that
labor supply operates only on the intensive margin.
The implications of the model for the dynamic correlations of diﬀerent variables over the
cycle can also be compared to data. For example, the correlation between output in adjacent
quarters is 0.70 in the model; in the data, it is 0.85. 24
3.4 Subsequent research
Kydland and Prescott’s methodology has been broadly adopted, and adapted to a variety
of frameworks for analyzing business cycles. The vast literature that has followed may be
organized into ﬁve diﬀerent categories: (1) extensions aimed at evaluating the consequences
when the stark simplifying assumptions, such as that of only one type of consumer or ab-
stracting from monetary issues, are relaxed; (2) analyses relying on other impulses, such as
monetary shocks or international shocks to the terms of trade; (3) studies considering dif-
ferent propagation mechanisms, such as those implied by imperfections in credit, labor and
goods markets; (4) investigations focusing on improved measurement of technology shocks
and other variables; and (5) studies aimed at improving the empirical analysis in the direction
of structural estimation.
Category 1. A number of simplifying assumptions made by Kydland and Prescott have
been relaxed and the main results have been found to be quite robust. These include homo-
geneity of ﬁrms and households (captured by the assumptions of a representative ﬁrm and a
representative household, as opposed to heterogeneity of ﬁrms and households in diﬀerent di-
mensions), perfect altruism across generations, the absence of idiosyncratic and uninsurable
consumer risk, the aggregation of goods into a single composite good, perfect substitutabil-
ity between consumption and investment goods, perfect competition in goods markets, no
role for money (as opposed to, say, a demand for money based on so-called cash-in-advance
constraints), the closed economy, and the exogeneity of technology improvements.25
The propagation and serial correlation properties of the model are aﬀe c t e dw h e na l l o w i n g
for costs of changing/reallocating the capital stock and the labor force over time and across
sectors. These properties are also aﬀected when nonconvex technologies, such as indivisi-
bilities in labor supply, are introduced to generate adjustment on the extensive margin of
employment, which is missing in the simple model of Section 3.3. Extensions of the model
to include costs of rapidly adjusting capital and labor in response to shocks help replicate
certain asymmetries that characterize the business-cycle data. For instance, recessions are
steeper and shorter than booms, estimates of responses to technology shocks suggest that
hours worked respond strongly but with a lag, and the components underlying the employ-
ment process–job creation and job destruction–have very diﬀerent time-series properties,
with job destruction far more variable than job creation (see, e.g., Gilchrist and Williams,
24For a more complete evaluation of the model’s predictions for the structure of leads and lags, see Cooley
and Prescott (1995).
25For an early survey of the literature, see Cooley (1995); for a more recent account, see King and Rebelo
(2000).
222000 and Campbell and Fisher, 2000). Moreover, consideration of variable utilization of fac-
tors of production has been shown to signiﬁcantly increase the amplitude of the economy’s
response to shocks (for a general discussion of this issue, see King and Rebelo, 2000).
Category 2. Many studies have suggested alternatives to aggregate technology shocks
as the source of cycles. Real impulses include shocks to relative world prices for raw materi-
als, shocks to the mechanism for wage setting implying changes in ﬁrms’ costs (“cost-push”
shocks), shocks to ﬁscal policy and government expenditures, or technology shocks that pri-
marily aﬀect a sector of the economy, rather than aggregate output. Demand shocks include
shocks to consumer preferences, e.g., “bursts of impatience”, even though the diﬃculty of
empirically measuring the size of such shocks makes them hard to assess. Preference shocks
are perhaps the closest counterpart to those which Keynes perceived as driving the economy,
although they may not represent “animal spirits of investors” or “consumer conﬁdence”.
One branch of the literature deals with shocks to information, i.e., news about upcoming
events, such as technology improvement.
Yet another branch of the literature examines business cycles from an international per-
spective. Some researchers have studied the reaction of small open economies to international
shocks, such as terms-of-trade or interest-rate shocks; see Mendoza (1991) and, for an early
application to the case of Sweden, Lundvik (1992). Other researchers have instead consid-
ered the transmission of business cycles across similar economies; for the ﬁrst contribution
to this line of research, see Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992).
Category 3. Many extensions have been motivated by the belief that a macroeconomic
theory where the basic ingredients of the business cycle can be captured in a perfect-market
framework misses important real-world features. Naturally, labor-market frictions that give
rise to equilibrium unemployment expand the domain of the model, but they do not nec-
essarily imply very diﬀerent time-series properties for output and investment. The same
applies when monopolistic elements are added to competition in goods markets.26 Despite
the added frictions, the basic methodology in this research is typically in line with Kydland
and Prescott’s approach, however. For example, the models of credit-market imperfections
in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) are explicitly founded on
microeconomics and derive market frictions from “ﬁrst principles”. Similarly, search and
eﬃciency-wage models of unemployment make assumptions about agents’ behavior derived
from microeconomic underpinnings. Some of these models feature qualitatively diﬀerent
propagation mechanisms than those found in Kydland and Prescott’s work. Thus, Kiyotaki
and Moore (1995) ﬁnd pronounced cyclical responses of output to single shocks, whereas
Kydland and Prescott’s theory tends to give monotonic responses.
Category 4. Renewed measurement of technology shocks has been undertaken using
several methods. One such method builds on Solow’s growth accounting (used for example in
Prescott (1986) and Kydland and Prescott (1988)), but substantially relaxes the underlying
assumptions. First, accounting has been conducted on a more disaggregated level, i.e.,
relaxing the assumption of an aggregate production function. Second, the assumption that
inputs are well measured has been relaxed by allowing (unobserved) factor utilization to
26For search frictions, see Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996) and for an eﬃciency-wage formulation, see
Danthine and Donaldson (1995). For an early analysis of a real business cycle model with monopolistic
competition, see Hornstein (1993).
23vary and by econometrically estimating the movement of factor utilization over the cycle
using instrumental variables techniques. Third, the assumption of constant returns to scale
and perfect competition has been relaxed: based on estimating the size of markups over
marginal costs, the same type of accounting method can still be used. These improvements
on Kydland and Prescott’s initial measures are discussed in Basu and Fernald (1997, 2000).
As u m m a r yo ft h eﬁndings is that estimates of short-run ﬂuctuations in technology remain
signiﬁcant; whether they have the speciﬁce ﬀect on the economy predicted by Kydland and
Prescott’s original model is a more open question.
Another, and quite diﬀerent, approach to measuring technology shocks is to estimate a
stochastic, vector-autoregressive (VAR) system of aggregate time series containing output,
measured labor productivity, and a set of other variables. In the VAR system, the shocks
driving the observed variables are then classiﬁed as supply (technology) shocks if they have
a permanent impact on labor productivity, which technology shocks should have; any re-
maining shocks are classiﬁed as demand shocks (see Blanchard and Quah, 1989). For this
approach, see, e.g., Gali (1999) and Fisher (2002). The results of this approach appear sen-
sitive to speciﬁcation details, but call into question the generality of Kydland and Prescott’s
original ﬁndings.
Category 5. Econometric estimation has gradually been adopted. As mentioned earlier,
traditional econometric estimation of a fully micro-founded business cycle model was not re-
ally an option when Kydland and Prescott made their original contribution, and may not
have been very productive in the early stages of the research program. But over time, as the
theory has become richer, computers have become more powerful, and econometric methods
have become more advanced, the situation has changed (category (5) above). Econometric
estimation of the stochastic growth model began with Altug (1989), but was undertaken in a
linearized version of the business cycle model. Later developments estimated key parts of the
model–such as ﬁrst-order conditions for savings and labor supply–using so-called general-
ized method of moments estimators (see, e.g., Hansen, 1982). Full structural estimation of
stochastic nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium models has now been undertaken as well.
Smets and Wouters (2003) provide a recent example of successful full-ﬂedged (Bayesian)
estimation of a model for the Euro area based on Kydland and Prescott’s work.
An important new literature, which deserves special mention, encompasses several of
the extensions discussed above. Commonly referred to as new-Keynesian business cycle
research, this literature examines monetary models of business cycles based on frictions in the
process of price and/or wage adjustment (see e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler, 2000, and Dotsey, King, and Wolman, 1999). These new-Keynesian
models are built around a core very similar to Kydland and Prescott’s model, but they also
include microeconomic assumptions on the costs of changing prices for ﬁrms, which typically
are assumed to interact under monopolistic competition. Price-setting and/or wage-setting
decisions are explicitly modeled as forward-looking and based on rational expectations. This
renders the analytical structure similar to that in Kydland and Prescott’s original work and
the new-Keynesian researchers have also borrowed their analytical tools. The resulting
models can give rise to a Phillips-curve. Monetary shocks produce potentially large eﬀects
on output, and monetary policy can produce, or stabilize, short-run ﬂuctuations. Models
of this type have also proved very useful for more complex analyses of the time consistency
24problems of monetary policy uncovered by Kydland and Prescott.
New-Keynesian frameworks have been applied to both positive and normative analysis
of diﬀerent monetary rules and institution design. Since the underlying theory rests on
explicit microeconomic assumptions, the evaluation of policy experiments is straightforward:
simulating the model for diﬀerent policy scenarios, the resulting welfare levels for diﬀerent
agents can easily be compared. Thus, the modeling allows not only qualitative, but also
quantitative welfare statements. Such policy evaluations are also attractive in view of the
Lucas critique. Since the models are formulated on the basis of deep parameters, they should
be more robust to the conduct of policy than aggregate reduced-form relations. In sum, the
new-Keynesian approach has synthesized earlier Keynesian analysis with the real business
cycle analysis originating in Kydland and Prescott’s work.
3.5 Broader impact
Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 paper transformed the academic research on business cycles.
Extensions and reﬁnements in the subsequent literature improved the ability of the original
model to match the macroeconomic data and allowed meaningful analyses of macroeco-
nomic policy. Models used in actual policy contexts have increasingly adopted Kydland and
Prescott’s methodology. Gradually, many models used in policy organizations and central
banks have come to incorporate microeconomic foundations in the form of rational savings
and labor supply behavior combined with rational expectations. One typical procedure has
been to formulate deterministic versions of Kydland and Prescott’s model–to be used for
medium-term counterfactual analyses–and to add an ad-hoc stochastic structure that allows
for rich short-run dynamics. Today, some organizations have complete operational versions
of Kydland-Prescott-style business cycle models incorporating full short-term dynamics.27
An alternative–although closely related–approach has been to look for ways of summa-
rizing full-ﬂedged Kydland-Prescott models using (approximate) reduced-form systems that
are easy to analyze and therefore convenient tools in policy analysis (see, e.g., Woodford,
2003 and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). Computer technology has deﬁned the frontier
of Kydland and Prescott’s research program, and the rapid recent advances in this technol-
ogy have greatly expanded the ability to solve and estimate highly complex versions of new
business cycle theories.
3.6 Related literature
The core of the real business cycle model is a neoclassical growth model with optimal sav-
ings decisions. Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) added optimal savings decisions to Solow’s
neoclassical setup, although they did not model labor supply. Stochastic shocks were intro-
duced into the optimal growth model by Brock and Mirman (1972), but their model was not
given an equilibrium interpretation and was not used to analyze technology-driven short-run
cycles. In their early contribution to the literature initiated by Kydland and Prescott, Long
and Plosser (1983) examined co-movement across sectors due to aggregate technology shocks
and coined the term “real business cycles”. Bruno and Sachs (1979) analyzed supply shocks,
27For an application to short-term forecasting, see del Negro and Schorfheide (2004).
25but not in the context of a fully dynamic and stochastic macroeconomic model based on mi-
croeconomic foundations. More generally, Kydland and Prescott’s approach to business cycle
analysis is linked to early articles by Frisch (1933) and Slutsky (1937), which showed how an
economy’s adjustment to a sequence of random shocks can give rise to cyclical ﬂuctuations
reminiscent of business cycles.
4 Recommended reading
Although rather technically demanding, Kydland and Prescott’s original articles from 1977
and 1982 are highly recommended. Several of the early articles on time consistency and
macroeconomic policy are reprinted in Persson and Tabellini (1994). For a survey of this
research, see Drazen (2000). For readings on Kydland and Prescott’s business cycle theory,
see the volume by Cooley (1995), which contains a series of surveys on diﬀerent aspects of
real business cycles. King and Rebelo (2000) provide an up-to-date comprehensive review,
while Prescott (1986) gives a non-technical introduction to the topic.
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